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Do Transaction Costs and Risk Preferences Influence Marketing Arrangements in the 
Illinois Hog Industry? 
 
Studies of hog industry structure often invoke risk reduction and transaction costs explanations 
for empirical observations but fail to directly examine the core concepts of risk behavior and 
transaction costs theories.  Using a more unified conceptual framework and unique survey and 
accounting data, this study demonstrates that that risk preferences and asset specificity impact 
Illinois producers’ use of contracts and spot markets as suggested by theory.  Factor analytic 
methods limit measurement error for indirectly observable risk and transaction costs variables 
employed in logit regressions.  In particular, related investments in specific hog genetics and 
specific human capital regarding the production process increase the probability of selecting 
long-tem contracts over spot markets.  Producers who perceive greater levels of price risk 
and/or are more averse to it appear more (less) likely to use long-term contracts (spot markets), 
and hence, to make such investments. 
 
Keywords:  risk behavior, transaction costs economics, risk attitude and risk perception, asset 
specificity, contracts, hogs. 
 
Introduction 
 
Once dominated by spot exchanges, the U.S. hog industry has experienced the greatest 
consolidation and increase in contract use of any major commodity in the last decade (Grimes 
and Plain 2005, 2007; Key 2004).  Vertical coordination has taken a different path in traditional 
Midwest production regions than in areas of recent expansion in the East, like North Carolina 
(Rhodes 1995; Kliebenstein and Lawrence 1995; Zering 2007).  Marketing contracts which may 
include cost-plus or price-window risk-sharing, are more common in the feedstuff abundant 
Midwest than input-providing production contracts and vertical ownership, which are prevalent 
in the East.1  Each of these arrangements are used by packers to secure specific hog genetics for 
branded pork products (Martinez 2002). 
 
The rapid restructuring of the industry and growth in alternative marketing arrangements 
has led to regulatory efforts at various levels of the government (c.f., Boehlje et al. 2001; Reimer 
2006; Henderson 2007).  Concerns for efficient price discovery with lower quantity and quality 
of livestock traded in spot markets prompted a $4.5 million Congress-mandated study (i.e., Muth 
et al. 2005), which found that alternative marketing arrangements benefit not only packers but 
also producers and consumers.  In light of these benefits, the factors influencing producers’ use 
of marketing arrangements are of interest to policymakers, economists, and industry participants. 
 
 Transaction costs economics (Williamson 1975), positive agency theory (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972), and property rights theory (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990) 
                                                 
1 The USDA's Agricultural Resource Management Survey (USDA-ARMS) recognizes two broad categories of 
contracts: marketing contracts govern only the terms of sale, while production contracts also involve contractor 
provision of inputs and may or may not bind the grower to a particular production process (Key and McBride 2003).  
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have been used extensively to explain organizational arrangements in many industries.  
However, as Robins (1987), Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990), and Chiles and McMackin (1996) 
suggest, the predictive power of such efficiency-based theories may be enhanced by explicitly 
accounting for heterogeneity in risk preferences.2 
 
 Previous research on the U.S. hog industry has offered either risk reduction (e.g., Johnson 
and Foster 1994; Kliebenstein and Lawrence 1995; Parcell and Langemeier 1997) or transaction 
costs (e.g., Cozzarin and Westgren 2000; Key and McBride 2003; Reimer 2006) explanations for 
marketing arrangements without explicitly examining the core concepts in risk behavior and 
transaction costs theories.  In the only study known to apply both theories, Davis and Gillespie 
(2007) were unable to find direct support for key risk behavior and transaction costs variables.  
Studies on the Dutch hog industry have found that producers’ preferences for price risk influence 
their marketing arrangements but have not examined the impact of transaction costs variables 
(e.g., Pennings and Smidts 2000, 2003; Pennings and Wansink 2004). 
 
Here, using a unified conceptual framework and unique survey and accounting data, we 
demonstrate that risk preferences and asset specificity, a transaction attribute, significantly 
impact Illinois producers’ marketing arrangements, as suggested by theory.  Marketing contracts 
that are common in the Midwest receive greater attention than in prior research, which focuses 
on production contracts and vertical ownership.  A major contribution is incorporation of risk 
behavior theory (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1971) into the transaction costs framework (Williamson 
1975).  Transaction costs theory suggests that higher levels of uncertainty and investments in 
assets that are specialized to a particular exchange relationship increase the likelihood of 
contracting.  However, since managers hold varying perceptions and attitudes regarding risk or 
uncertainty, the interaction of risk attitude and risk perception may better explain their choices 
(Pennings, Wansink, and Meulenberg 2002; Pennings and Wansink 2004). 
 
Survey data were collected in personal interviews with producers who participate in the 
Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) program that resides at University of Illinois and 
keeps records on their operations.  The secondary data were used to control for business 
characteristics, such as size and debt or leverage, while the primary survey data offer superior 
measures of theoretical concepts like asset specificity (Macher and Richman 2006).  Factor 
analysis (Hair et al. 1995) determines which combinations of survey items best measure the risk 
and transaction costs variables which are only indirectly observable with error. 
 
 
Transaction Costs and Risk Behavior Theories 
 
Marketing channel literature remains fragmented in economic and behavioral approaches.  
Transaction costs theories based on Coase’s (1937) seminal work have been applied extensively, 
while risk behavior theory (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1971) has been relatively underutilized. 
 
                                                 
2 Mahoney and McNally (2004) note that transaction cost economics assumes exchange between risk neutral 
principals and agents (Chiles and McMackin 1996), while agency theories assume that the agent is risk averse 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
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Transaction cost economics, positive agency theory, and property rights theory grew 
from Coase’s (1937) insight that the costs of operating alternative organizational forms and  
reassigning property rights render the organization of exchange and the initial assignment of 
property rights relevant for efficient outcomes.  There has been substantial progress towards 
joining these three theories of organizational economics (e.g., Mahoney 1992; Kim and Mahoney 
2005), which are all positive transaction costs theories.  Adopted organizational forms minimize 
these costs.  As transaction costs are not easily measured (Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990), 
researchers typically test for the predicted alignment of organizational forms with transaction 
attributes – asset specificity and uncertainty. 
 
Asset specificity is an asset’s degree of specialization toward an exchange relationship 
(Lajili et al. 1997).  Williamson (1985) categorizes specific assets as physical (e.g., specialized 
tools or equipment), human (e.g., firm-specific knowledge), or site (e.g., co-location of an 
electric plant and a coal mine).  Such investments have lower (salvage) value outside of the 
relationship.  The difference in value, a quasi-rent, is subject to the threat of appropriation via 
superior bargaining power, if not properly safeguarded (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978).  
Long-term contracts sufficiently protect quasi-rents at intermediate levels of asset specificity 
(Joskow 1987), but vertical ownership is necessary at extreme levels of asset specificity 
(Mahoney 2005). 
 
Reviews of empirical transaction costs studies (e.g., Mahoney 1992; Shelanski and Klein 
1995; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997; Macher and Richman 2006; David and Han 2004) reveal that 
most types of uncertainty encourage tighter coordination of marketing channels.3   Contracts 
limit exposure to environmental uncertainty regarding supply, demand, prices, and revenues, 
whereas vertical ownership counteracts behavioral uncertainty (called performance ambiguity in 
positive agency theory) by facilitating performance evaluation (Mahoney 1992; Rindfleisch and 
Heide 1997).  When outcome measurement is difficult, agents’ actions may be monitored in 
vertically integrated firms if task programmability is high, meaning that principals (managers) 
can specify the steps of the contracted task in advance (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). 
 
The above discussion reveals that market governance is efficient only under sufficiently 
low uncertainty and asset specificity if the traded product or service is easily measured, e.g., 
standardized commodity like #2 yellow corn (Mahoney 1992; Mahoney and McNally 2004).  
The following hypotheses relate these transaction attributes to the organizational form of interest 
in this study – long-term contracts. 
 
H1 Greater uncertainty leads to greater (less) use of contracts (spot markets).   
 
H2 Greater asset specificity leads to greater (less) use of contracts (spot markets).   
 
 
                                                 
3 As an exception, uncertainty regarding the rate of technological change deters vertical integration (Balakrishnan 
and Wernerfelt 1986), which results from a reluctance to invest in specific assets that may soon be obsolete (Stump 
and Heide 1996). 
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While uncertainty and complexity contribute to market failures and incomplete contracting in the 
above reviewed theories, none of them explicitly address individuals’ awareness (i.e., 
perceptions) and attitudes about risk.  Pennings, Wansink and Meulenberg (2002) showed that 
the Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971) framework implies that risk management, as reflected in the 
risk premium, is a function of risk attitude and risk perception (the latter reflected in the variance 
of additional wealth).  Based on this result, Pennings and Wansink (2004, p. 699) conjectured: 
 
“We do not expect risk attitude and risk perception to individually have a direct impact 
on the contract strategies employed by channel members.  Instead … we believe it is the 
combination of risk attitude and risk perception that influences behavior.  After all, 
regardless of one’s individual risk attitudes a channel member will not change his or her 
behavior if no risk is perceived in a given situation.”  
 
Following Pennings and Wansink (2004), the interaction between risk attitude and risk 
perception (IRAP) is positive when channel members perceive risk and are risk-averse, negative 
when channel members perceive risk and are risk-seeking, and zero when channel members 
either do not perceive any risk or when they are risk neutral.  In this context, we offer the 
following hypothesis. 
 
H3 Greater IRAP values lead to greater (less) use of contracts (spot markets).   
   
Viewing price risk as a type of environmental uncertainty, hypothesis H3 is a refinement of the 
transaction costs hypothesis H1 with uncertainty replaced by IRAP.4  This perspective offers a 
more complete treatment of managerial choice by explicitly incorporating risk preferences.  
Thus, replacing hypothesis H1 in the transaction costs framework by hypothesis H3 yields a 
more unified conceptual model. 
 
 
Review of Hog Industry Research 
 
Several research studies have examined the factors affecting the structure of the U.S. hog 
industry, but have provided limited support for risk reduction and transaction costs explanations.  
Whereas Cozzarin and Westgren (2000) and Reimer (2006) ran simulations to predict optimal 
marketing arrangements, Key and McBride (2003) and Davis and Gillespie (2007) explained 
actual marketing arrangements. 
 
Cozzarin and Westgren (2000) simulated rent sharing across farrowing, nursery, and 
finishing stages for North Carolina integrators (franchisors) compared to three-firm alliances.5  
In accord with property rights theory, simulations implied that to be competitive with integrators, 
                                                 
4 Knight’s (1921) distinction between risk (randomness with knowable probabilities) vs. uncertainty (randomness 
with unknowable probabilities) parallels transaction cost theory’s distinction between uncertainty vs. uncertainty 
plus complexity compounded by bounded rationality.   
   
5 The integrator owns the first stage and contracts the second and third stages, providing inputs and retaining 
ownership of the hogs.  In contrast, hogs are owned jointly under the alliance, and the input costs of each stage are 
incurred by the stages’ respective operators. 
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alliances must shift claims to residual rents from finishing to farrowing, the stage which most 
impacts system profits.  In contrast to positive agency theory, pig-space guarantees did little to 
offset downstream financial risks associated with underproduction in farrowing by integrators.6 
 
Reimer (2006) applied Grossman and Hart’s (1986) property rights model to processors’ 
choice between in-house and contract feeder pig production.  Numerical solutions revealed that 
production contracts are optimal except in a small numbers scenario of few producers where both 
contract and hired producers underinvest or in the scenario where processors’ (specific) 
investments in value-added or branded products are more important to system profits than 
investments in the managerial ability of producers. 
 
Key and McBride (2003) suggested that their finding of greater production contract usage 
by larger farms reflects buyers minimizing transaction costs by contracting with fewer and larger 
farms.  Contractees also were significantly more likely to have less education, less experience 
raising hogs, a major occupation off-farm, and lower average net returns to their hog operations 
(suggesting a lower reservation wage).  In contrast to the conjecture that risk-reducing contracts 
may enhance producers ability to obtain debt financing, Key and McBride (2003, p. 132) found 
“no significant difference between contractees and independent producers in terms of their debt-
to-asset ratio” and suggested that “for the same investment, contract growers can produce more 
because they do not have to purchase animals, feed, and the equipment provided by contractors.” 
 
Davis and Gillespie (2007) drew upon transaction costs and risk behavior theories to 
explain use of spot markets, cooperatives, and flat-fee and incentive-based production contracts 
using a multinomial logit model.  Moving along this continuum, autonomy became successively 
and significantly less important to producers.  College educated producers were more likely to 
use cooperatives than flat-fee contracts, and older producers were more likely to remain 
independent than use cooperatives.  The results also were consistent with independent producers 
managing risk via diversified agricultural production and smaller producers (with less than 3,000 
head of hogs) reducing risk with flat-fee contracts.7  Producers also raising corn were less likely 
to select cooperative or contract production, as such arrangements may limit the use of on-farm-
raised feedstuffs.  The variables of arguably the most theoretical interest – risk attitude and 
specialization in stages of hog production – lacked statistical significance for any marketing 
arrangement.8 
 
Pennings and Smidts (2000) found that use of futures contracts and average price sales 
through cooperatives was significantly more likely as Dutch hog producers became risk-averse.  
                                                 
6 Under the pig-space guarantee the integrator (franchisor) pays a fixed fee per pig-space to cover the franchisee’s 
fixed facility costs. 
 
7 Though the authors hypothesized a positive relationship between contract use and farm size, they note that the 
negative relationship found for flat-fee contracts is plausible if these contracts are mostly between farmers, where 
the grower has empty, older facilities and the contractor wishes to expand. 
 
8 Based on the task programmability argument of positive agency theory, contracting was hypothesized to be more 
likely for farms specializing in one or two of the three stages, since it is easier to specify the steps of a single stage 
such that provided inputs yield a certain output. 
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Both options entail less risk than spot market sales.  There was evidence that the interaction of 
risk attitude and risk perception (IRAP) impacts transaction frequency, suggesting that risk-
averse producers who perceive high risks sell more frequently to receive average market prices. 
 
Pennings and Wansink (2004) showed that use of spot transactions and fixed-price 
contracts by Dutch hog producers, wholesalers, and processors can be explained partly by IRAP, 
their bargaining power, and market structure.  Channel members with positive IRAP scores (risk-
averse) bought and sold using fixed-price contracts in markets without natural hedges and spot 
transactions when natural hedges existed.  Channel members with negative IRAP scores (risk-
seeking) bought and sold using spot transactions in markets without natural hedges, while they 
used contracts on either the buying or selling side and spot transactions on the other when natural 
hedges existed. 
 
 
Research Design 
 
One hundred and three producers were identified as possible survey participants in the 
University of Illinois Extension’s Farm Business Farm Mangagement (FBFM) cooperator 
database.  The farms were selected to be representative of commercial hog farms in the state 
(Lattz, Cagley, and Raab 2005, p. 1).  Four rounds of pre-tests – two with FBFM personnel and 
two with producers – were performed.  In each case, survey items were modified, eliminated, 
and added based on the comments. 
 
All producers were contacted, and as encouragement for their participation were offered a 
chance at one of ten $100 lottery prizes.  In total, 50 producers participated in personal 
interviews that lasted an average of one hour and twenty minutes.  One producer’s responses 
were not included in the analysis due to incomplete accounting data.  Binary dependent variables 
– CONTRACT and SPOT – are coded based on the producers’ primary marketing arrangements 
(Table 1).  The design is consistent with Pennings and Wansink (2004, p. 707), where it was 
“coded whether channel members used fixed-price contracts or spot transactions with their main 
contract parties.”  CONTRACT equals one if 1 if greater than 50 percent of production is sold 
using long-term marketing or production contracts and equals zero otherwise.  SPOT equals one 
if greater than 50 percent of production is sold at spot prices through spot market transactions, 
verbal commitments, or cooperative sales and equals zero otherwise.9  Empirical results are 
reported for the full sample of 49 producers, but a subsample comprised only of 29 producers 
that use primarily marketing contracts or spot market sales yields qualitatively similar results for 
transaction costs and risk variables of primary interest. 
 
 Secondary accounting data provided measures of farms’ size and leverage, while primary 
survey data capture producers’ age, experience, and education and whether they specialize in 
particular stages of the hog production process.  These variables are defined in Table 2. 
                                                 
9 Following convention in transaction costs economics, we distinguish verbal commitments from formal (written), 
legal contracts subject to third-party (judicial) sanctions (Masten and Saussier 2002).  Producer-ownership 
distinguishes cooperatives from contract and independent production.  Davis and Gillespie’s (2007) results suggest 
that independent producers significantly differ from cooperative producers only in that they are older and value 
autonomy even more.     
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Empirical Methods 
 
Factor Analytic Methods to Account for Measurement Error 
 
Measures for risk behavior and transaction costs variables are constructed from survey items 
(Table 3) using factor analysis, since these theoretical concepts are observable only indirectly 
with error (Hair et al. 1995).  Relationships between relevant survey items (i.e., indicants) are 
summarized in a smaller set of more parsimonious variables (i.e., eigenvectors called factors) 
that are used in subsequent analyses to conserve degrees of freedom and improve power against 
Type II error (Thompson 2004).  Furthermore, the unreliable variance in the original variables 
tends to be discarded once they are reexpressed as factors. 
 
 
Logit Regressions 
 
Though organizational research deals with the extent of vertical integration along a continuum 
from spot transactions to complete vertical ownership, much of the research investigates 
questions of a more dichotomous nature (e.g., y = 1 if contract; y = 0 otherwise).  Here, we use 
logit regressions to investigate the factors influencing contract and spot market use, assessing the 
ability of the transaction costs, risk behavior, and unified frameworks to explain behavior.   Logit 
procedures estimate the probability Pr(y = 1│x) = (ex´β) / (1 + ex´β) = F(x´β), where x and β are 
vectors of explanatory variables and coefficients, respectively, and F(·) is the logistic cumulative 
distribution function.  Sykuta (2005) and Hoetker (2007) summarize best practices for logit (and 
probit) models which are followed here. 
 
Though statistical significance usually can be inferred directly from coefficient test 
statistics, the economic significance (or marginal effect) of an explanatory variable depends on 
the values of the other explanatory variables (Sykuta 2005; Hoetker 2007).  Unless particular 
values are of interest, marginal effects are often computed at the mean  (Long 1997).  We report 
the average of marginal effects computed for each observation, since no observation is likely to 
have mean values for all variables (Train 1986).  These average marginal effects can differ from 
those computed at the mean by a factor of three (Talvitie 1976) but are very similar for our data.  
The marginal effects of continuous variables are ∂F(·)/∂x = F(·)[1 - F(·)]β, and the marginal 
effect of a dummy variable is the change in the expected probability when the dummy changes 
from zero to one, evaluated at specified values of the other explanatory variables (Sykuta 2005).  
The standard error of the marginal effect is computed as the square root of the variance of the 
marginal effect (G×V(β)×G’)0.5 using the delta method (c.f., Greene 2003, p. 674), where G 
contains the derivatives of marginal effects with respect to parameter estimates and V(β) is the 
estimated variance-covariance matrix of parameter estimates. 
 
As Hoetker (2007) notes, several different pseudo-R2 measures exist for logit models, 
none of which equate to R2 in ordinary least squares regressions.  A model’s proportion of 
correct predictions can also be misleading, since a naïve model always predicts at least fifty 
percent correctly.  Hence, the proportion correctly predicted by the naïve model is listed 
alongside that of the models presented here for comparison. 
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Empirical Findings 
Following the “K1”rule, notable factors possess characteristic roots (i.e., eigenvalues) greater 
than one.  Such factors consist of survey items with high factor loadings and explain the majority 
of common variance.  Our measures are reliable (Table 4), as indicated by Cronbach’s (1951) 
alpha, which should be greater than 0.70 (Streiner and Norman 1995). 
 
Correlations are presented in Table 5.  First, observe that CONTRACT and SPOT are 
nearly inverses except for slight deviation due to futures and options or forward contract usage.  
These dependent variables have less correlation with the risk perception factor than with the risk 
attitude and IRAP factors.  AGE and EXPERIENCE are highly correlated, as are IRAP and the 
risk attitude factor.  Highly correlated variables are not included simultaneously in regressions to 
prevent multicollinearity. 
 
SIZE (i.e., thousands of hogs marketed per year) and various measure of asset specificity 
exhibit moderate positive correlation with the dependent variables.  The largest of these 
correlations is for the fifth physical asset specificity item which reflects investments in specific 
hog genetics.  This item loaded nearly evenly on HUMAN and PHYSICAL factors, and hence, 
was excluded from their computations to preserve the unidimensionality of the factors.  
Interestingly, the magnitude of the correlations between the dependent variables and human (and 
genetic, i.e., physical5) asset specificity are similar to those with IRAP (and risk attitude). 
 
Logit results for transaction costs, risk behavior, and unified frameworks are compared in 
Table 6.  Here, asset specificity is operationalized by the survey item concerning investments in 
specific hog genetics.  The human asset specificity factor behaves similarly but exhibits slightly 
lower statistical significance, while physical and site asset specificity factors are insignificant. 
 
The risk behavior models outperform the transaction costs models in terms of the 
proportion of observations on CONTRACT and SPOT correctly predicted but yield the lowest 
values of McFadden’s R-square.  The unified framework offers even greater predictive power for 
CONTRACT but not for SPOT.  Closer inspection reveals that in four of the six cases where the 
risk behavior model outperforms the unified framework the estimated probabilities of spot 
market use were very close for each model but on opposite sides of the 50 percent cut-off value 
for a prediction of one. 
 
In each model, the findings for business characteristics corroborate prior research, 
lending credence to our treatment of cooperative producers and producers with verbal 
commitments as spot market participants.  As in Key and McBride (2003), larger farms are more 
likely to contract.  Average marginal effects for SIZE suggest that the probability of using long-
term contracts (spot markets) increases (decreases) around two to three percent for every 
additional thousand hogs sold.  While Key and McBride (2003) find no evidence that production 
contracts improve producers’ access to external debt, Davis and Gillespie’s (2007) results 
suggest that contract producers incur fewer input costs and hence bear less debt than independent 
producers.  Here, greater capacity to repay debt, as reflected by higher values of LEVERAGE, is 
associated with less contracting and greater spot market use.  Consistent with Davis and 
Gillespie’s (2007) expectations for age and Key and McBride’s (2003) findings for experience, 
we find that older (likely more experienced) producers are more likely to use spot markets than 
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long-term contracts.  While the sign on EDUCATION is consistent with Key and McBride’s 
(2003) findings, it is statistically significant only in the risk behavior model for SPOT.10 
 
The most important finding, however, is that this research offers the first direct empirical 
support for the significance of asset specialization and risk preferences as predictors of 
marketing arrangements in the U.S. hog industry.  Though UNCERTAINTY offers no 
significant support for hypothesis H1 (Greater uncertainty leads to greater (less) use of contracts 
(spot markets)), SPECIFIC GENETICS provides stronger support for hypothesis H2 (Greater 
asset specificity leads to greater (less) use of contracts (spot markets)).  Strong statistically 
significant support also is obtained for hypothesis H3 (Greater IRAP values lead to greater (less) 
use of contracts (spot markets)), as average marginal effects indicate that a unit increase in IRAP 
increases (decreases) the probability of using long-term contracts (spot markets) by one to two 
percent.  As in Davis and Gillespie (2007), however, STAGE provides no statistically significant 
support for the positive agency theory concept of task programmability in unreported results. 
 
Notice that the moderately correlated risk and transaction costs variables (Table 5) vie for 
significance in the unified model (Table 6).  The inclusion of IRAP in SPOT regressions erodes 
the significance of SPECIFIC GENETICS, relative to the results for the transaction costs model.  
Conversely, IRAP loses significance with the inclusion of SPECIFIC GENETICS in 
CONTRACT regressions, relative to the risk behavior model.  Such results may imply that it is 
often risk-averse producers who accept processors’ contracts requiring specific investments.  The 
resulting correlation between risk and transaction costs variables contributes to the difficulty in 
disentangling their effects.  In SPOT regressions, lower (higher) significance of asset specificity 
(IRAP) variables may also reflect use of futures, options, and forward contracts, which entail no 
asset specificity but mitigate risk.  Overall, the results support hypotheses H2 and H3.   
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Previous research has offered risk avoidance and/or transaction costs minimization explanations 
for U.S. hog industry structure, with little empirical support.  Here, we examine factors 
influencing the marketing arrangements of hog producers in Illinois, and verify the relevance of 
risk behavior and transactions costs theories using a unified framework of organizational 
theories.   The unified framework outperforms separate risk behavior and transaction costs 
frameworks in terms of the ability to predict producers’ use of long-term contracts. 
 
By incorporating a more explicit treatment of risk preferences within the transaction costs 
framework, we find that risk preferences and investments in assets tailored for a specific 
exchange relationship are significant predictors of marketing arrangements.  For instance, the 
interaction of risk attitudes and risk perceptions (IRAP), as defined by Pennings and Wansink 
(2004), has a positive (negative) impact on contract (spot market) use.  Thus, consistent with risk 
behavior theory (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1971), producers who are more averse to price risk and 
                                                 
10  If cooperative and independent production are indeed similar, the sign on EDUCATION is also consistent with 
Davis and Gillespie’s (2007) finding of a significantly negative impact of education on the use of long-term 
contracts relative to cooperatives. 
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perceive more of it are more likely to select contracting over spot market sales.  Failure by Davis 
and Gillespie’s (2007) to identify a risk attitude effect likely reflects their focus on investment 
rather that price risk. 
 
Consistent with transaction costs economics (Williamson 1975), producers’ investments 
in human capital and hog genetics that are specific to the relationship with their primary buyer 
also are positively (negatively) related to their use of long-term contracts (spot markets).  
However, no statistically significant support was found for such investments in physical assets 
(e.g., equipment and facilities) or assets that are site specific.  As observed by Ménard and 
Klein’s (2004), site specificity may be less important in the hog industry than in the poultry 
industry, because hogs can be transported greater distances without losing value.  The general 
consistency of our results with the efficiency-based predictions of transaction costs economics 
further supports Muth’s (2007) testimony to policymakers that livestock industry participants 
adopt marketing arrangements that benefit all involved. 
 
Despite a limited sample size, the study identifies significant effects using a unique 
combination of accounting data and survey data.  The use of factor analysis (Hair et al. 1995) to 
summarize survey items as a smaller and more parsimonious set of reliable transactions costs and 
risk behavior variables contributed to this success by conserving degrees of freedom and 
improving power against Type II error (Thompson 2004).  Future agricultural marketing channel 
research should consider the use of these procedures to assess systematically the factors 
influencing observed behavior.  Even with these carefully developed procedures, it is difficult to 
completely identify the theoretical framework and empirical representations that are most 
consistent with observed behavior.  Based on our findings, researchers may need to dig more 
deeply into appropriate procedures and data sets to understand the core features influencing 
observed behavior in marketing channels. 
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Figure 1.  The Influence of the Interaction of Risk Attitude and Risk Perception on 
Adoption of Marketing Arrangements. 
 
Note:  Adapted from Pennings and Wansink (2004). 
 
Table 1.  Primary Marketing Arrangements used by Sampled Producers. 
Primary Sales Method 
Number of 
Producers 
Processing Cooperative 7 
Pooling Cooperative 6 
Forward Contracts 1 
Verbal Commitments 4 
Marketing Contracts 13 
Production Contracts 1 
Spot Markets 17 
Note:  Statistics reflect use of a particular marketing arrangement for over fifty percent of production. 
 
Table 2.  Definitions of Directly Measured Explanatory Variables. 
Variable  Definition 
SIZE Thousands of hogs sold in 2006. 
LEVERAGE Capital replacement and term debt repayment margin, 
which at higher values indicates greater capacity to replace 
capital assets, repay debt, and service additional debt 
(Financial Guidelines for Agricultural Producers  1997). 
AGE Producer’s age in years. 
EXPERIENCE Number of years that the producer has raised hogs. 
EDUCATION Equals one if the producer has completed four or more 
years of college and equals zero otherwise. 
STAGE Equals one if the producer operates only one of the three 
stages of hog production and equals zero otherwise. 
 
Contract 
Spot 
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Table 3.  Risk Perception, Risk Attitude, and Asset Specificity Survey Items. 
Risk Perception Items 
RP1 How risky do you consider market prices for hogs? 
RP2 How risky do you consider selling your hogs in cash markets? 
RP3 How do you rate market prices for (weaner, feader, finished) hogs in terms of financial risk 
they pose to your farm income? 
RP 4 I see large fluctuations in hog prices that expose me to risk. 
RP 5 Hog prices possibly could fall below my cost of production, and hence, expose me to risk. 
RP 6 I can predict hog prices. 
RP 7 The cash hog market is not risky at all. 
  
Risk Attitude Items 
RA1 I usually like “playing it safe” (for instance, “locking in a price”) instead of taking risks for 
market prices for (weaner, feader, finished) hogs. 
RA2 When selling/marketing my hogs, I prefer financial certainty to financial uncertainty. 
RA3 When selling/marketing my hogs, I am willing to take higher financial risks in order to 
realize higher average returns. 
RA4 I like taking financial risks with my hog farm business. 
RA5 I accept more risk in my hog farm than other hog farmers. 
RA6 With respect to the conduct of business, I dislike risk. 
  
Asset Specificity Items 
Human1 I have learned about production methods that my primary buyer wants me to use, and this 
knowledge is of little value if I deliver to a different buyer. 
Human2 The relationship with my primary buyer has become valuable in terms of the 
experience/knowledge that we share regarding each other's practices & needs. 
Human3 Experience (information) regarding each other's practices and needs is an aspect of the 
relationship with my primary buyer that I value. 
Human4 Experience (information) regarding each other's practices and needs is an aspect of our 
relationship that my primary buyer likely values. 
Human5 My primary buyer considers my understanding of its input needs and/or operating/trade 
procedures key to our relationship. 
Physical1 I could not recover the full value of my investments in specialized equipment and/or facilities 
if the relationship with my primary buyer ended. 
Physical2 My production system has been tailored to meet the requirements of dealing with my primary 
buyer. 
Physical3 I’ve made significant investments in equipment and/or facilities dedicated to the relationship 
with my primary buyer. 
Physical4 I own equipment and/or facilities that were required by my primary buyer. 
Physical5 My primary buyer requires me to use specific genetics or blood lines. 
Site1 My primary buyer likely values the close location of my production operations for timely 
delivery of hogs. 
Site 2 My primary buyer sources its hogs from a particular region. 
Site 3 The nearness of my production operations to my primary buyer’s location is beneficial to me. 
Site 4 The distance I must travel to deliver my product (transportation costs) plays a role in my 
choice of a primary buyer. 
Site 5 The number of nearby buyers impacts my choice of a primary buyer. 
Note:  Risk perception items 1 through 3 scaled 1 = “not at all risky” through 9 = “very risky.”  Risk perception 
items 4 through 7 and Risk attitude items scaled 1 = “strongly disagree” through 9 = “strongly agree.”  Asset 
specificity items scaled 1 = “strongly disagree” through 7 = “strongly agree.” 
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Table 4.  Results of Reliability Analysis for Components of Constructs. 
 Survey Cronbach's Alpha  
Bootstrapped Factors Items Original Items Standardized Items 
  RISK PERCEPTION RP1-RP5, RP7 0.777 0.783 
  RISK ATTITUDE RA1-RA6 0.785 0.780 
  HUMAN ASSET SPECIFICITY HU1-HU5 0.897 0.896 
  PHSICAL ASSET SPECIFICITY PH1-PH4 0.902 0.913 
  SITE ASSET SPECIFICITY SI1-SI5 0.845 0.845 
Note:  RP, RA, HU, PH, and SI respectively denote risk perception, risk attitude, and human, physical, and site asset 
specificity items.  The items were reverse coded when appropriate. 
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Table 5.  Correlations of Dependent and Explanatory Variables. 
 CONTRACT SPOT AGE EXP ED SIZE LEV STAGE HU SI PH Physical5 RP RA IRAP 
CONTRACT 1.00               
SPOT -0.83 1.00              
AGE -0.19 0.36 1.00             
EXP 0.06 0.12 0.81 1.00            
ED -0.20 0.23 0.14 0.05 1.00           
SIZE 0.26 -0.27 0.06 0.16 0.06 1.00          
LEV -0.27 0.20 -0.12 -0.14 0.13 -0.56 1.00         
STAGE 0.09 -0.02 0.17 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 0.01 1.00        
HU 0.35 -0.28 0.06 0.13 -0.13 0.15 -0.30 0.11 1.00       
SI 0.07 -0.09 0.05 0.06 -0.37 0.05 -0.09 0.15 0.36 1.00      
PH 0.18 -0.12 0.00 -0.11 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.17 0.53 0.24 1.00     
Physical5 0.52 -0.38 -0.02 0.10 -0.10 0.18 0.04 0.01 0.56 0.11 0.6 1.00    
RP 0.03 -0.03 0.31 0.32 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.23 -0.03 0.10 1.00   
RA 0.32 -0.41 -0.19 -0.05 0.01 0.18 -0.05 0.05 0.45 0.20 0.32 0.41 0.04 1.00  
IRAP 0.30 -0.37 -0.18 -0.05 0.04 0.17 -0.04 0.00 0.47 0.19 0.33 0.41 -0.06 0.98 1.00 
Note:  Observations = 49.  EXP, ED, and LEV respectively denote experience in years, education (= 1 if 4 years of college; = 0 otherwise), and leverage as 
measured by the capital replacement and term debt repayment margin.  STAGE denotes specialization in one of the three stages of hog production.  RA, RP, and 
IRAP respectively denote risk attitude and risk perception factors and their interaction.  HU, PH, and SI respectively denote human, physical, and site asset 
specificity factors.  Physical5 similarly denotes specific investments in hog genetics. 
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Table 6.  Marginal Effects for Various Logit Models of Marketing Arrangements. 
 Transaction Costs Model Risk Behavior Model Unified Framework 
Marginal Effect CONTRACT SPOT CONTRACT SPOT CONTRACT SPOT 
SIZE 0.0155 -0.0280** 0.0243* -0.0322*** 0.0159 -0.0269** 
 (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0132) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0118) 
LEVERAGE -0.0007*** 0.0008*** -0.0007** 0.0007*** -0.0007** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
AGE -0.0145*** 0.0273*** -0.0131* 0.0237*** -0.0129** 0.0231*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0063) (0.0054) (0.0061) 
EDUCATION -0.1156 0.1616 -0.1615 0.1813* -0.1195 0.1612 
 (0.0991) (0.1034) (0.1130) (0.1099) (0.1052) (0.1003) 
RISK PERCEPTION 0.0273 -0.0554 – – – – 
 (0.0505) (0.0464)     
IRAP – – 0.0113** -0.0127*** 0.0052 -0.0101* 
   (0.0056) (0.0048) (0.0061) (0.0055) 
SPECIFIC GENETICS 0.0599*** -0.0393** – – 0.0572*** -0.0302* 
 (0.0126) (0.0170)   (0.0135) (0.0178) 
       
McFadden's R2 0.4259 0.4045 0.2632 0.3913 0.4334 0.4303 
% Correctly Predicted 78 82 84 88 92 82 
Note:  49 observations. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
71% (63%) of observations for CONTRACT (SPOT) are correctly predicted by naïve models.  CONTRACT = 1 if primarily 
production or marketing contract sales; else 0.  SPOT = 1 if primarily spot sales; else 0.  SIZE is thousands of hogs sold per year.  
LEVERAGE is the capital replacement and term debt repayment margin, which indicates greater ability to pay back debt at 
higher values.  AGE is in years.   EDUCATION = 1 if 4 years of college; else 0.  RISK PERCEPTION is the risk perception 
factor.  IRAP is the product of risk attitude and risk perception factors.  SPECIFIC GENETICS is the survey item regarding 
producers’ investments in specific hog genetics.     
 
 
 
